Reds Adroit At Use Of Even Their Foes by Hoover, J. Edgar
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Clippings James W. Silver Collection 
10-5-1961 
Reds Adroit At Use Of Even Their Foes 
J. Edgar Hoover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jws_clip 
Recommended Citation 
Hoover, J. Edgar, "Reds Adroit At Use Of Even Their Foes" (1961). Clippings. 309. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jws_clip/309 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the James W. Silver Collection at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Clippings by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact 
egrove@olemiss.edu. 
U4 4 .. ... 
~~~/q{p( 
. . I ··· 
ERCIAL AP~EAL, MEMPHIS!..J 
'CommunistParty Line'-
Reds Adroit At Use 
Of Even Their Foes 
Last of three articles from a report 
prepared for the Senate Internal Se· 
curity Committee on · "The Communist 
Party Line,." 
By J. EDGAR HOOVER 
Director. Federal Bureau of Investi"tion 
In its never-ending struggle for 
power, the Communist Party, U.S.A., 
uses a wide variety of tactics, all de-
signed, in one way or another, to 
strengthen the party's influence and, at 
the same time, to divide, weaken, and 
confuse the anti-communist opposition. 
A favorite-and fre uentl effect' -
CommunIs actic is the polic of" ar-
t! or "immediate" demands. These 
- are the short-term or temporary de-
mands which the Communists advance 
in order to create favorable conditions 
for future revolutionary action. The 
pages of the Worker, Political Affairs, _ 
Mainstream, and other Communist pub-
lications are filled with these demands. 
The public speeches and statements of 
party leaders are largely based on them. 
Indeed, these demands play a vital rol~ 
in the Communist Party line at any 
given time. 
The immediate demands . which the 
Communists advance vary greatly in 
s~~ and objective. They may be local, 
regional, na:tioftlil, or intematibnal in 
range. They may be of Interest- to a 
large majority of the population or only 
to a limited minority group. They may 
involve economic, social, political, or cul-
tural issues, and they may vary in sig-
nificance from a proposal relating to 
world peace to a demand for improved 
low-cost housing in a specific slum area. 
ghere is probably no significant section. 
JEf the AmerIca[: p"6ij;::regardies s .Di 
I age, race, socilll standin ,occupation or 
po I C orlen a on w ose Interests I have not COInCided, on occaSIOn, With one 
or more of the Communists' immediate 
demands. 
In itself, ~ach of · the immediate de-
mands pr<>I!osed by the ~arty tna~ be 
entIrely legitimate or c,uj papula , In 
nature, representing the desire for a 
limited and specific reform within the 
framework of our present system of gov-
ernment. ' Very frequently, these de-
mands do not originate with the Commu-
nists at all but in wholly non-communist 
segments of the population. 
It goes without saying, of course, that 
the immediate demands put forward by 
the party at any given time must be in 
close accord with the fundamental stra-
tegy of the world Communist movement 
during that particular period. . . . 
The Communists derive a number of 
advantages from their immediate-de-, 
mands tactic. Urging specific reforms 
in which many non-communists are legi-
timately interested helps the Communists 
to identify themselves with the "masses" 
and to foster the image that the party is 
a progressive, enlightened, humanitarian 
organization which is acting in the best 
interests of the American people .. . . 
The immediate-demands tactic also 
serves as a convenient disguise behind 
which the party can carry on its cease-
less agitation against our free economy. 
More~rtant stjllL- the immediate-de-
mands tactic enables the party to subtly 
instill a feeling of "class-consciousness" 
among employes, to promote a general 
feeling of unrest and discontent among 
large sections of the population- in the 
words of the Communists themselves, 
to "radicalize" and to "polticalize" the 
masses. . . . / 
For this reason, the party's strenuous 
campaign for immediate demands is 
never allowed to subside. As soon as 
one set of demands is met, the Commu-
nists immediately propose new and 
stronger demands calculated to provoke 
a new controversy and to act as a new 
source of social friction and unrest. . . . 
In addition, the immediate-demands 
tactic provides party members with 
frequent opportunities to work among 
the "masses" and to gain valuable ex-
perience in agitating, organizing social 
discontent, and guiding large numbers of 
people in the "class struggle." The fight 
for specific reforms enables the party 
to te~t its leadership, discipline, and or-
ganizational ability in practical situa-
tions. In effect, the struggle for imme-
diate demands serves as a small-scale 
model of, and a dress rehearsal for, 
future revolutionary action, thereby af-
fording the Communist "vanguard" in-
valuable. experience. 
The cumulative aim of the party's 
immediate-demands tactic, therefore, is 
to condition the entire social climate for 
eventual revolutionary action. If these 
tactics are sUccessfui, the Communists 
will have been accepted as the leaders 
of the "masses" who, in turn, will be 
led to believe that there. is a need for a 
drastic transformation of the entire 
social sy~tem; and non-communist oppo-
sition will have been weakened and 
divided to the point of hopeless confusion. 
In short, the party will have successfully 
laid the groundwork for launching the 
actual revolution. 
This is the real meaning of the Com-
munist Party line, which promises all 
things to all lIlen. I IS ~muI!y ' de-
..signed to. appeal to people from every 
walk of . life, and, at the same time to 
confuse the public by blending propo~als 
ostensibly sponsored by the Communists 
with those of legitimate organizations. 
~e qninformed citizen is tbus 
doubly misled. He may accept the party 
fIne at ItS face value, wUhout realIZing 
that It IS Just another Communis1: tactic, 
~nd err~n.eously conclude that the party "' 
I~ a legItImate political group which is 
~lncerely interested in promoting these 
I Issues. Or, he may wah the equally dangerous a~~~'~~~~~~~~~ l ad,:"ocates proposais similar to thos whJ(!h make up the partY Hne is auto-matically a Communist. ~cause commumsm thrives on tur-
~Oll , the par~y is continuously attempt-
!ng ~o explOit all grievances- real or 
Im~gmed-for its own tactical purposes. 
It IS. therefore, al ost in . 
.... ;;:;:.::.~~aIrlrI.t:....Ju.wJ1..4 
on mapy issues the parfy line will coin-
Cide With the sition 
munists . The d 
issue .ha n to arallel the offici osi-! . n IS 0 VIOUS. The confusjon whiC;Cb 
IS. th~reb created hel s the Communists 
b t e r 0 nents: 
Unfortunately:, . there are those whQ 
make the very mistake the Communists 
are so careful to avoid The~ individuals 
concentrate on the negatiye rather tjV;n 
on the P2sitive. The.v are merely again~ 
fommuDlsm without being for any DOsi-
!IV~ . measures to eliminate the soa-al, 
political. and. economic fi'ictjons wfi@1 
the, Communists are so adroit at ex-
p10ltmg. -
These personS would do well to recall 
a recent le~~n from his~ory. Both H!t1e.r 
Howev~r, it was ~y what they stood for, 
not agaInst, that history has judged them. 
